The following is a detailed look at history of conflict among Papuan Peoples in Indonesia, and the “Special Autonomy Legislation” that was implemented, allegedly in the best interests of Paupan Peoples.

Messages of solidarity for the people of West Papua
http://www.converge.org.nz/pma/wpsol.htm

You are invited to send a message of solidarity to the people of West Papua. This web page was launched on 1 December 2004, the forty-third anniversary of the West Papuan Declaration of Independence from Dutch colonial rule.

Since 1963 West Papua has been occupied by Indonesian armed forces. For the past forty-one years, the people of West Papua have been subjected to gross human rights violations including rape, torture, cultural genocide, murder and massacre - more than 100,000 West Papuans have been killed. More than 15,000 West Papuans are currently living in camps in Papua New Guinea; and others are forced to live in exile around the world because it is not safe for them to go home.

Multi-national corporations in cahoots with the Indonesian authorities have exploited West Papua’s natural resources to an extraordinary degree. This has caused massive social dislocation, devastation of rainforests, and pollution of streams and rivers on which the local people depend for their survival. As well as the direct violent repression by Indonesian armed forces, they are creating armed militias, similar to what they did in East Timor.

Add your voice to those of people all around the world who are calling for justice, peace and self-determination for the people of West Papua.

Papuan Independence and the Wahid Administration
from: www.preventconflict.org
After decades of continuous rule under the Suharto regime, Indonesia democratically elected President Abdurrahman Wahid in October 1999. Wahid publicly announced that the Indonesian government should accept blame for part of West Papua/Irian Jaya’s difficulties and that reforms would be instituted promptly. In an even more unexpected move, Wahid, who had spent New Year’s Day 2000 in West Papua/Irian Jaya, announced that the name of the region should once again be changed back to West Papua. However, Wahid also made it clear that he did not favor outright independence for West Papua/Irian Jaya. In the months following Wahid’s election, the Morning Star flag was freely raised and preparations were made for a Papuan People’s Congress which would serve as a clearing-house for Papuan concerns, grievances, and proposals. On December 1, 1999 Papuans held a rally announcing the anniversary of the declaration of West Papuan independence, first ‘œachieved” on December 1, 1961. Although flag-raisings were permitted on the day of the rally, and violence was avoided, the following day witnessed a number of deadly clashes between independence supporters and the Indonesian military.

During a preparatory meeting, known as the Great Consultation, for the upcoming Congress, the Papuan Presidium Council (PDP) was formed. The PDP, which would serve as the administrative head of the Papuan independence movement, was created as a largely inclusive body with leaders from various branches of politics, religion, academia, and the community. The OPM, guerilla operatives fighting for Papuan independence since the early 1960s, was ultimately excluded. The Congress, a gathering of several thousand Papuans, was marked by debate as to how West Papua/Irian Jaya’s future could be best realized. Ultimately, the Congress declared in early June 2000 that West Papua/Irian Jaya was an independent and sovereign nation.

Click here to read the Papuan Congress Resolution.

The culmination of the Congress was a high-water mark in Papuan independence efforts. The congressional declaration of independent sovereignty wrought a shift in Jakarta’s perspective on Papuans. President Wahid subsequently stated publicly that the congress was illegitimate, and although he believed the freedom of political views to be worth protection, organized threats to Indonesian sovereignty were illegal and unacceptable.

During the latter half of 2000 and 2001 the approach of Wahids administration changed significantly. Wahid’s political adversaries used the congress as leverage to spin the Wahid administration as anti-Indonesian. Such power plays in Jakarta helped move the central government’s position on West Papua/Irian Jaya closer to the more conservative stance of the Suharto/Habibe rule.

Although many Papuans were empowered by the congress and began to expect independence, the actual and immediate result was a crackdown of military and police units throughout West Papua/Irian Jaya. In addition to the changing political calculus in Jakarta, another variable affecting state-province relations was the formation of Papuan Taskforces which had come about during the Great Consultation as a security measure. The Taskforces primarily consisted of Papuan youth and were dominated by the politics of Papuan liberation. Although the Taskforces provided an outlet for Papuan empowerment and pride, they also degenerated on occasion into roving bands of violence primarily aimed at Javanese migrants. This violence served as a further catalyst for harsher military rule, and ultimately the banning of the Papuan national flag.

Special Autonomy versus Independence
As part of Wahid’s conciliatory efforts, a group known as the Forum to Examine Special Autonomy Laws for a New Papua submitted an offer of special autonomy to the MPR in April 2001. The Forum is comprised of local administration officials, NGO activists, and councilors, and is not aligned with the political stance of the PDP and OPM. A month before the submission, West Papua/Irian Jaya’s local government held a workshop in the capital city to discuss autonomy. The Papuans ultimately walked out of the meeting in protest, demanding independence over autonomy for West Papua. Given the fractured atmosphere in the province, it is not at all clear that a Megawati-approved autonomy bill in the future would satisfy Papuan demands for independence.

The question of autonomy was first officially broached after Suharto’s resignation, as pressures were quickly mounting on the newly appointed Habibe. Hoping to assuage growing resentment and facilitate the decentralization process, Habibe presented two proposals to the MPR. These laws, passed in April 1999, created an important division of powers between the central and regional authorities. Defense, foreign affairs, religion, the administration of justice and monetary and fiscal policy remained core duties of the central government, while public services such as education, health care and infrastructure now fell under regional control. A previously existing hierarchical relationship between the provinces was also eliminated. Under the new laws, provinces would receive a significantly larger portion of the central government’s revenues, including 15% of onshore oil revenues, 30% of onshore gas revenues, roughly 80% of mining and forestry revenues, 20% of local income-tax receipts and about 25% of a special fund of centrally collected revenue.

The nomenclature of the process involves the offer of “regional autonomy” to all provinces, as described above, and “special autonomy” to the more unstable regions of West Papua/Irian Jaya and Aceh. Although the definition of “special autonomy” in this context is still somewhat unclear, the offer includes the economic benefits of the regional plans, as well as greater political independence and control. However, the central government’s offer prohibits a referendum on independence, insisting that while moderate autonomous growth may be permissible, this will in no way jeopardize the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Indonesian state.

The Papuan bill for special autonomy, proposed in April 2001, has 76 clauses outlining West Papua’s demands that would ultimately end its formal wishes for independence and bring West Papua much fuller and more substantive control over its domestic affairs.

Some of the bill’s contents include the following:

-Any “indigenous” Papuan inhabitant must have at least one Papuan parent

-Special autonomy applies to the indivisible province of Papua, as opposed to local regencies as usually applied under regional autonomy laws

-Papuan provincial parliament will consist of two chambers with an upper house of indigenous officials and a lower house for political representatives

-A Papuan flag, symbol, and anthem

-Papua to have all governmental powers except international political relations, external defense, monetary policy, and the supreme court

-Papua to have its own police force

-Papuan provincial government to control all taxation resources, with 20% of the revenue to go to the central government

-The creation of a human rights court

-The granting of a right to compensation for all victims of past human rights abuses

-A guarantee of religious freedom

-The ending of transmigration policies

-The Papuan right to self-determination if a special historical commission decides that the annexation of ,Papua into Indonesia is illegal under international law

Read full text of Special Sovereignty Law here

The bill was passed by the Indonesian parliament on October 22, 2001. In its final form, it gives West Papua 70 percent of royalties from mining and 80 percent from logging and fishing. Additionally, the law grants the province its own flag and anthem and changes the name of the province from Irian Jaya to Papua. The bill is scheduled to enter into effect on December 22, 2001 during a visit by Megawati to the province.

Likelihood of Continuation
The brief Wahid administration probably posed the greatest chance for West Papuan reconciliation, despite the often paradoxical relations between Jakarta and the province between 1999 and 2001. However, it is likely that despite Wahid’s rhetoric of moderation and appeasement, West Papua’s hopes for independence would never have been realized. Wahid had even said as much, claiming that Papuan independence was an affront to Indonesian unity.

Shortly after becoming president in July 2001, Megawati Sukarnoputri assigned the newly appointed vice-president Hamzah Haz the role of implementing special autonomy in West Papua. The new administration has consistently stated that independence is not an option.

There were high hopes within the government that the special autonomy bill on October 22, 2001, would quell support for the separatist movement in West Papua. However, the pro-independence Papuan Presidium Council (PDP) immediately rejected the bill, saying that the Papuan people had not been sufficiently involved in the process and that it failed to address past human rights abuses. Nonetheless, many felt that the bill would still be received positively by many in West Papua.

The reconciliation process experienced a major setback on November 10, 2001, when Theys Eluay, president of the Papua Presidium Council and a venerated independence leader, was killed in an apparent assassination. News of the killing sparked rioting in the capital and many feared that a renewal in the conflict was inevitable. Supporters of Eluay have claimed that the military was responsible for the killing. However, the military denies culpability and no blame has been placed on any group as of early December 2001. Observers have called for the government to create an independent commission to investigate this sensitive issue. The special autonomy bill is scheduled to enter into effect on December 22, 2001 and it remains to be seen how it will be received. In a troubling move, the government announced in late November 2001 that it planned to rotate military forces, around 50 battalions through West Papua and other separatist provinces throughout Indonesia. This has led to fears that the government is prepared to use military force, rather than to solve conflicts through dialogue and negotiation.

Ten thousand Papuans criticize special autonomy implementation
http://www.converge.org.nz/pma/wp130805.htm
13 August 2005 - At least 10,000 Papuans stormed into the office of the Papua provincial legislative council in Jayapura on Friday, demanding the government to review its Special Autonomy Law.

The protesters, in one of the largest such demonstrations ever in the province, claimed that the special autonomy was a total failure as it had failed to live up to people’s expectations in Papua.

The protesters started at Trikora Field in Abepura in the morning, and from there, they marched to the legislative compound. Due to fears of clashes, many schools, offices and shops were closed as the protesters made their way through Jayapura city, some 25 kilometers from the Trikora Field. Other shops and residents along the way prepared food and water for the protesters, who also were demanding justice.

The demonstrators, some wearing traditional Papuan attire, carried a coffin covered with black cloth bearing Otsus (special autonomy), which meant that special autonomy had failed to improve the life of Papuans. Besides demanding the government to hold national and international dialogs to solve the Papuan problem, the demonstrators, led by the secretary of the Papuan Tribal Council, Leo Imbiri, also demanded the Papuan provincial council members convene a plenary session and formally reject special autonomy.

Responding to the demand, speaker of the Papuan provincial council Jhon Ibo argued that it was premature to say that the Special Autonomy Law was a failure as it was just a few years old and the implementation process was still ongoing. Ibo rejected the demand for a plenary meeting, but he promised that the provincial council would intensify dialogs with the Papuan Tribal Council in order to discuss the future of special autonomy.

Leo stated that special autonomy was the best way for Papua to improve, but he argued that parts of the implementation had not yet lived up to people’s expectations. First, he said, the government was sluggish in issuing the Presidential Decree on the Papuan People’s Council. It was finally launched three years after the Special Autonomy Law was issued in 2001, which brought disappointment to many Papuans. The Special Autonomy Law provided more authority for the provincial administration to manage its own affairs, while the central government retained some powers such as in the matters of security and international affairs. And second, Leo protested, the government approved the establishment of West Irian Jaya province, which effectively partitioned Papua province and violated the 2001 law. The original 2001 law states, however, that the establishment of a new province must be approved by the Papuan People’s Council, while in fact, West Irian Jaya was set up before the MRP was founded. Protests against the Special Autonomy Law, were not only held in Jayapura but also in other areas in Papua, such as Sorong and Biak, although far fewer people took part.

The massive expression of disappointment comes just weeks after some members of the US Congress proposed a bill questioning the validity of the process leading to the 1969 Act of Free Choice in Papua, when a group of some 1,000 selected Papuan leaders voted unanimously to become part of the Republic of Indonesia.

Root of conflict and peace agendas for Papua
http://www.thejakartapost.com
January 08, 2006
Muridan S. Widjojo, Jakarta

The meeting between Vice President Jusuf Kalla, flanked by Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs Widodo AS, Minister of Home Affairs Mohammad Ma’ruf and Indonesian Military (TNI) chief Gen. Endriartono Sutarto, and the official leaders of the province of Papua on Nov. 24, followed by the talks with the leaders of West Irian Jaya province the next day, resulted in a positive consensus.

The conflict over the election of local leaders in West Irian Jaya will be settled based on Law No. 21/2001 on special autonomy and Government Regulation No. 54/2004 on the Papuan People’s Assembly (MRP). This implies that the process of creating a legal umbrella for West Irian Jaya will start with a white paper drafted by the governor of Papua, which will then be studied by the Papuan provincial council and brought to the MRP for approval. Subsequently, it will be forwarded to the central government via the minister of home Affairs.

This process is expected to last a month. According to the consensus, the central government will issue a regulation in lieu of law to provide legal protection for West Irian Jaya. If Jakarta firmly adheres to the accord, the door will likely be open for a comprehensive resolution of the root causes of the Papuan conflict.

However, it is worth noting that the agreement was reached only after the provincial council and MRP had rejected the unilateral plan by the Ministry of Home Affairs to hold local elections in West Irian Jaya, and threatened to reject the government initiated special autonomy and demand a referendum. This threat reflected the pinnacle of disappointment and anger among Papuan people and provincial leaders at the government’s arbitrary policies and disregard for the Special Autonomy Law.

The success of Vice President Jusuf Kalla in breaking the political deadlock in Papua is in fact only superficial. The conflict over the elections in West Irian Jaya is just a small symptom of a much bigger problem.

Throughout 2005, the central government and provincial administration found themselves at loggerheads over a number of issues. The most significant consequence of this was a high level of Papuan dissatisfaction with the application of special autonomy, as manifested in the demonstration by 15,000 people organized by the Papuan Tribal Council in August.

Their reasons are obvious.

First, socioeconomic development in the region is making little significant progress. The public health service is seen as inadequate, and the HIV/AIDS question is not being properly handled. The education sector remains plagued by a lack of facilities and teachers. Widespread poverty amid Papua’s natural riches is still the order of the day.

Second, little progress has been made on the human rights and state violence questions. To mention but a few cases, the legal process in respect of grave rights violations in Wamena and Wasior has stalled in the Attorney General’s Office. A 2004 military operation in Puncak Jaya (2004) that resulted in serious rights abuses has not even been officially reported yet. Worse still, the first permanent Human Rights Tribunal (2005) has failed to punish rights violators in Abepura (2000). The victims in the case were taken aback by a defense attorney’s statement that the accused should be considered “heroes” and the injured parties “separatists”.

Third, the demand for “setting the historical record straight” in Papua and hopes for reconciliation have not been responded to wisely.

The Papuans’ demands for freedom are connected with the historical issue. This problem will hamper Papua-Jakarta reconciliation and the effort to build healthier political ties. The people of Papua will continue to question their political history in various local, national and international forums.

The Vice President, and even the President himself, have emphasized the need to settle the problems of West Irian Jaya and Papua by taking account of the aspirations of the Papuan people and provincial leaders. Whatever course of action is decided upon in resolving the West Irian Jaya issue, Jakarta must avoid unilateral action. The Papuan side, particularly state leaders in the provincial council and MRP, and the governor, should be fully involved.

The West Irian Jaya problem looks likely to be long drawn out and will not be settled within one month as targeted by Vice President Jusuf Kalla. Differing views will arise between the governor of Papua and the MRP, with the governor accepting the splitting of Papua into five provinces and the MRP tending to reject this. This is not to mention the possible introduction of another agenda by the Ministry of Home Affairs in Jakarta, which is apparently set on pushing through the local election plan.

If the West Irian Jaya issue can be properly resolved, the central government and Papuan leadership will be able to prepare three peace agendas to get to the root of the conflict in Papua.

First, Papua’s development can be accelerated based on a new special autonomy paradigm that prioritizes the empowerment of indigenous Papuans in the social economy, health and education sectors. Conflicts over natural resources should be resolved based on the principles of justice and benefit to local communities.

Spending on the Papuan bureaucracy should be reduced and priority given to community development spending. Parallel to this, corruption cases, such as that involving the Jayawijaya regent, should be brought to trial.

Second, human rights should be upheld while at the same time putting an end to the impunity enjoyed by the military and police. As a start, the Abepura case should be appeared. The files on the Wamena and Wasior cases should also be improved and delivered to the court for trial without delay. The entire legal process and control over prosecutors and judges should be tightened to prevent outside intervention on behalf of defendants.

Third, the question of “straightening out Papuan history”, the territorial integrity of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia and reconciliation should be addressed by opening a dialog between Jakarta and Papua. This should be aimed at reaching a compromise between the “nationalist” and “separatist” poles.

In this regard, all the important elements of Papuan society should be represented, covering the grassroots like the Papuan Tribal Council, the Presidium of Papuan Councils and Churches and official leaders in Papua. The President should appoint a committee made up of members knowledgeable about Papuan affairs and experienced in negotiating. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has promised that the Aceh peace deal will be a model for Papua.

In the context of the internationalization of Papua, the government should realize that the best diplomacy would be improved Jakarta-Papua relations based upon concrete action in line with the three agendas described above.

There are two principal views in international circles on Papua.

Some NGOs and Indonesian experts believe that Papua could become a second Timor Leste. Other NGOs and Indonesian specialists disagree with this view because, first, Papua has been recognized as part of Indonesia by the United Nations since 1969 and, second, there has been explicit confirmation by influential nations like the U.S., Australia, the Netherlands and Britain that Indonesia has sovereignty over Papua.

The second group tends to believe that special autonomy is more logical and realistic for Papua.

Nonetheless, all the optimism could dissipate if, first, rights violations are ignored and the security forces continue to enjoy impunity; second, Indonesian troops, perhaps also police personnel, go out of control and commit new rights infringements; and, third, a unilateral policy on Papua continues to be imposed by the Ministry of Home Affairs, thus increasing antipathy on the part of both informal and formal Papuan leaders.

All this would give more reason to the international community to question the 1969 decision on integration and encourage a referendum in Papua. If this were to happens, a Jakarta-Papua political stalemate would be inevitable. Political violence would increase and disintegration would become part of the agenda.

The writer is a researcher at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), Jakarta, and a PhD candidate in history at University of Leiden in the Netherlands.

Further Reading:
Genocide in Papua? report published August 2005 (pdf)
Special Autonomy is the Act of Free Choice - Phase 2
Indonesia Watch
West Papua the forgotten Pacific country
Prevent Conflict, Indonesia